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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
HAVE THE FEDERAL COURTS REACHED A CONSENSUS
ON HOW TO INTERPRET TITLE VII CLAIMS ALLEGED BY
PLAINTIFFS WHO IDENTIFY AS LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, OR
TRANSGENDER?
By Nicholas Larkin

I. Introduction:
Discrimination, especially when it occurs in the workplace, is a controversial and
complicated subject that society has struggled to overcome for many years.1 When workplace
discrimination is directed towards those who identify as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, or Transgender
(LGBT), employment discrimination becomes even more complex.2 Employment discrimination
is complex because the federal statute that prohibits discrimination based on sex does not address
workplace discrimination against those who identify as LGBT.3 Many within the LGBT
community have attempted, with varying levels of success, to use statutes and inventive legal
theories to further their suits that allege workplace discrimination.4 For instance, transgender
plaintiffs typically argue, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), that
employment discrimination occurred because of gender.5 On the other hand, gay or lesbian
plaintiffs typically argue under Title VII that employment discrimination occurred because of
their sexual orientation or lack of gender conformity.6 This paper will examine the federal
statute most commonly used in LGBT employment-discrimination cases, Title VII, by analyzing
and discussing federal case law to determine the current state of employment-discrimination
claims made by LGBT individuals.
Determining the current state of the law as it pertains to employment discrimination
against LGBT individuals requires several steps. Section II will discuss the history of Title VII
and the steps Congress took to pass it. Section II will further elaborate on the amendments made
1

See Judy Bennett Garner & Sandy James, Employment Discrimination Against LGBTQ Persons, 14 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 363, 365-69 (2013).
2
See Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against LGBT People:
The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal Employment Benefits, 45
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 728-31 (2012).
3
E.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2007); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2001).
4
E.g. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259-61 (1st Cir. 1999).
5
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009); E.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 736-38 (6th
Cir. 2005); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 657-59 (S.D. Tex. 2008);
Garner & James, supra note 1, at 370-71.
6
E.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2009); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater
Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (D. Or. 2002).

to Title VII that are pertinent to LGBT individuals and briefly discuss the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Section III will briefly discuss how the disparate treatment
and disparate impact theories affect court decisions and discuss cases heard by the Supreme
Court, circuit courts, and district courts that deal with the issues LGBT individuals face in Title
VII employment-discrimination claims. Section IV will conclude this article by discussing the
current state of LGBT discrimination claims under Title VII.

II. A Short History of Title VII
A. The creation of Title VII
Title VII’s creation was neither easy nor short; it passed only after a great deal of debate
and opposition from many members of Congress.7 The 1950s and 1960s saw the strengthening
of the Civil Rights Movement and the public’s growing desire for equality for all; these events
placed a great deal of pressure on Congress to enact legislation that could help level the playing
field for all residents of the United States.8 Despite the enactment of several statutes in the 1950s
and early 1960s that were designed to displace employment discrimination, they were largely
unsuccessful.9 However, in the early 1960s, several key Congressional members and the
President of the United States began to apply even greater pressure on Congress to pass a more
comprehensive civil rights statute.10
At the time of Title VII’s passage, the political landscape was very complex.11 Because
of Title VII’s complex political nature, Title VII’s wording was constantly changing in order to
garner enough support to pass through both houses of Congress; others proposed language
changes in an effort to defeat the bill.12 For instance, one Congressman made an attempt to
block Title VII from being passed into law during its final considerations by adding the phrase
“because of sex” to Title VII’s language.13 He was unsuccessful, however, for Title VII did pass
in both houses of Congress with the added language.14
Throughout Title VII's existence, courts have opined that this one phrase, “because of
sex,” was meant only to provide protection for a person’s gender, not for a person’s sexual
orientation.15 Dissenters of this consistent judicial perspective argue, however, that the creation
of Title VII was meant to protect all those within the United States from multiple forms of
7

See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV1417, 1423-25 (2003).
8
ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 41-42 (1993).
9
See id. at 42-43.
10
See id. at 43-45.
11
See id. at 43-52.
12
See id. at 45-52.
13
See id. at 45.
14
ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 45 (1993).
15
Garner & James, supra note 1, at 369-70.

discrimination and to correct the many discrepancies faced by minority groups in daily life.16
Under this latter view, Title VII’s protections should extend to LGBT individuals.17

B. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Congress originally only authorized the EEOC to investigate, accept claims, and create
reports on Title VII discrimination.18 But when Congress made additions to Title VII in 1972,
the EEOC’s authority was expanded to include having the ability to file suit on behalf of an
employee who had been discriminated against by a non-government employer.19 Congress felt,
when passing the amendments to Title VII in 1972, that the EEOC did not have the adequate
authority to effectively investigate allegations and enforce its findings.20 Congress remedied
these concerns, in part, by giving the EEOC the power to bring suit against private companies
that were allegedly in violation of Title VII; Congress further expanded Title VII’s scope by
allowing discrimination cases originating from local and state governments to be considered
under Title VII.21
The EEOC has provided guidance on what it considers to be sexual harassment and how
an employee should be able to prove his or her employment-discrimination case under Title
VII.22 However, the EEOC’s powers are limited in many respects because the EEOC’s opinions
and guidance regarding sex discrimination are only considered to be persuasive authority and are
not binding upon any United States court.23

C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 as a clarification and strengthening of Title VII
The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 stemmed from several factors that
included the court system’s interpretation of Title VII gender harassment.24 Congress felt that
the court system was not correctly interpreting Title VII because of court decisions such as Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.25 The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Price Waterhouse, that an
employer could avoid liability for sex discrimination if it could show that it would have made the
16

See Cody Perkins, Sex and Sexual Orientation: Title VII After Macy v. Holder, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 428-29
(2013).
17
See id. at 428 (explaining that evolving interpretations of Title VII's "because of sex" provision were expanded to
include discrimination based on sex stereotyping).
18
Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, The 40th Anniversary of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Symposium: Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 672-73 (2005).
19
See Occhialino & Vail, supra note 18, at 677.
20 20
See id.
21
42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009); see Occhialino & Vail, supra note 18, at 677-78 (noting that the amendments
expanding Title VII's coverage hampered the EEOC's ability to manage its caseload).
22
See generally Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. §1604.11 (1999).
23
Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1937, 1938-39
(2006).
24
Civil Rights Act of 1991 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 239-41(1989).
25
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-41; see Occhialino & Vail, supra note 18, at 686-87 ((describing three statutes,
including the Civil Rights Act of 1991, that Congress enacted that impacted the EEOC's enforcement efforts).

same decision in any event, was rejected by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.26 The Supreme
Court’s decisions during this time period, which included Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, created
a disparity for plaintiffs when they attempted to obtain a remedy in sexual harassment cases.27
Because of the lack of a remedy for a plaintiff’s damages in sexual harassment cases, the public
put great pressure on Congress in 1991 to correct and amend the court system’s interpretation of
Title VII sexual harassment claims.28 The public was further concerned as a result of Justice
Thomas’s confirmation hearing for the Supreme Court, where sexual harassment allegations
were made against him.29 As a result of the public’s pressure to amend Title VII, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.30
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, in addition to doing away with a mixed-motive defense,
provided further protections against sexual harassment in the workplace by allowing punitive and
compensatory damages to be awarded in certain circumstances.31 The Civil Rights Act of 1991
was also meant to address the extension of gender protections in the workplace to assist in
preventing discrimination.32

III. Case Law Examining Alleged Employment-Discrimination of LGBT
Individuals Under Title VII
This section will briefly discuss the differences between disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories of discrimination. This section will also present the federal court cases that have
played a role in Title VII interpretation related to employment discrimination alleged by LGBT
individuals in three subsections that examine relevant Supreme Court decisions, relevant
appellate decisions, and relevant district court decisions.33

A. Disparate treatment and disparate impact
Disparate treatment and disparate impact are two theories courts use to reach a
conclusion concerning alleged employment discrimination. As defined by the Supreme Court,
disparate impact involves “practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a
disproportionately adverse effect on minorities.”34 Disparate treatment, on the other hand, is
defined by the Supreme Court as behavior that “occur[s] where an employer has ‘treated [a]
particular person less favorably than others because of’ a particular trait.”35
26

Civil Rights Act of 1991 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-41;
BLUMROSEN, supra note 8, at 285.
27
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258; Id. at 259 (White, concurring); see BLUMROSEN, supra note 8, at 282-85.
28
BLUMROSEN, supra note 8, at 284-85.
29
See id. at 284.
30
See id.
31
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); BLUMROSEN, supra note 8, at 285.
32
BLUMROSEN, supra note 8, at 285.
33
E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d
1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002).
34
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
35
Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988)).

LGBT individuals do not use the disparate-impact theory as often as they use disparate
treatment in Title VII employment-discrimination claims.36 Disparate treatment is used in LGBT
workplace-discrimination cases because the treatment is generally far more explicit.37 There are
instances, however, where employers exhibit disparate impact-like behavior when making
employment decisions associated with these individuals.38 For instance, an employer concerned
about potential litigation could, as noted in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, inadvertently affect
an LGBT individual by instituting a policy that unwittingly discriminates against an LGBT
individual.39 The court in Etsitty stated that “[i]t may be that use of the women’s restroom is an
inherent part of one’s identity as a male-to-female transexual and that a prohibition on such use
discriminates on the basis of one’s status as a transsexual.”40

B. The foundations of Title VII interpretation in the federal court system
The United States Supreme Court cases discussed in this section have played a pivotal
role in interpreting Title VII suits that allege employment-discrimination against LGBT
individuals.41
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Company: The inception of the disparate-impact test.42
In the history of Title VII employment-discrimination interpretation, Griggs was the first
Supreme Court decision that shaped how disparate impact could be used in workplacediscrimination claims under Title VII.43 The case arose when Duke Power Company (Duke)
created two aptitude tests and a transfer requirement, hoping to produce a way to determine
which employees were best suited for promotion or transfer to another division within Duke.44
On its face, the testing requirement was not discriminatory, nor was there any apparent intent to
discriminate.45 Before the passage of Title VII, Duke openly discriminated against its African
American employees.46 But in 1955, Duke did create a policy requiring a high school diploma
for any transfer or appointment to all departments within Duke, excluding the labor department,
which constituted all of Duke’s African American employees.47
36

See Daniel M. Le Vay, Sex Discrimination in Job Assignment or Transfer as Violation of Title VII of Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), 123 A.L.R. FED. 1, 18 (1995).
37
See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2001); Le Vay, supra note 36, at 18.
38
See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218-20 (10th Cir. 2007); Le Vay, supra note 36, at 18.
39
See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219, 1224.
40
See id. at 1224.
41
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998);
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v. Foklift Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. 17 (1994); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
42
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26.
43
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28 (discussing the enactment history of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009) and its
relevance to an organization’s testing and requirement standards).
44
See id.
45
See id. at 428.
46
See id. at 426-27 (discussing the actions of companies before the enactment of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17
(2009)).
47
See id. at 427.

When Title VII was passed and became effective, Duke required those who were
employed in the labor department who desired a transfer or a promotion to another department to
hold a high school diploma as well as take and obtain a satisfactory score on two tests.48 Duke
allegedly created the employment requirements to ensure that the performance of an employee in
a new department at Duke would be satisfactory.49
The tests and education requirements proved to be discriminatory, however, towards
Duke’s African American employees.50 The tests were discriminatory because African
Americans had received an inferior education and as a result, they were not adequately prepared
to take an aptitude test.51 The test did not measure skills related to performance of the specific
jobs.52 Because of this policy’s impact, the African American employees at Duke collectively
filed suit against Duke, alleging that Duke’s tests and requirements were discriminatory under
Title VII.53 The district court proclaimed that since Title VII was only meant to be prospective
and not retrospective, and because Duke had not intentionally committed discrimination against
its African American employees, Duke would prevail in the case.54
Griggs appealed the district court’s decision, where the circuit court partially reversed the
district court’s decision, noting that discrimination on the part of an employer before the passing
of Title VII could still be actionable if the discrimination was residual.55 The circuit court,
however, maintained that it must be shown that there was racial purpose or an intent that was evil
in the creation of a set of requirements by an employer for Griggs’s claims to be applicable under
Title VII.56 Because of the conflicting views held throughout the federal court system, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.57
The Supreme Court opined that the tests and requirements of an organization must be fair
in how they are applied and how they are used in practice; that a test or requirement must be
related to a job to be legitimate; that a business must show it had a legitimate business reason in
using a test or requirement; and that the business reason had to be connected to the result of a test
or requirement.58 Because Duke failed to show how its promotion requirements were job related,
the Court proclaimed Duke discriminated against African Americans.59

48

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-428 (1971).(discussing the actions of certain organizations before
the enactment of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009)).
49
See id. at 431.
50
See id. at 430.
51
See id.
52 S e e i d . a t 4 2 8 .
53
See id. at 425-26 (discussing Congress’s inclusion of class action lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17
(2009)).
54
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1971).
55
See id at 429.
56
See id. (discussing the circuit courts’ interpretation of Congress’s intent regarding 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17
(2009)).
57
See id.
58
See id. at 431-34.
59
See id. at 436.

Griggs is an important decision for all plaintiffs because it provides a way for plaintiffs to
show how they have been discriminated against in the workplace under a theory other than
disparate treatment.60 In Griggs, the Court created and used disparate impact for the first time by
recognizing that Duke's standardized tests caused many African Americans to be excluded from
certain jobs, despite being capable of performing the jobs, because of poor education.61
Furthermore, Griggs helped to protect minority groups from discrimination in the workplace
under Title VII by requiring an employer to provide a legitimate business reason for any
requirements or tests used by the employer.62
2. McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green: Shifting burdens of proof.63
When considering Supreme Court cases that affect claims of Title VII employment
discrimination, McDonnell Douglas Corp. has provided an important foundation for plaintiffs to
prove an allegation of disparate-treatment workplace discrimination.64 Green was laid off by
McDonnell Douglas, and because of this layoff, Green began organizing and implementing
demonstrations at the McDonnell Douglas plant.65 When several new positions at McDonnell
Douglas were created, Green applied for these positions, but McDonnell Douglas decided not to
reemploy Green because of his involvement in the demonstrations.66 Green brought suit against
McDonnell Douglas citing, in part, racial discrimination on the part of McDonnell Douglas for
refusing to rehire Green.67 The district court ruled in favor of McDonnell Douglas by citing the
EEOC’s failure to find discrimination against Green as well as Green’s participation in the
demonstrations against McDonnell Douglas; Green appealed the district court’s decision.68 The
circuit court, proclaiming that a claim did not require, as a prerequisite for jurisdiction, the
EEOC’s finding of cause, affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s decision and
remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of Green’s discrimination
claim.69 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court.70
The majority created a test of shifting burdens to determine the reasons for the
employer’s actions.71 First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
denoting:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
60

See id. at 431.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
62
See id. at 31.
63
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
64
Id. At 807
65
See id. at 794.
66
See id.
67
See id.
68
See id.
69
See id. at 797-98.
70 S e e
McDonnel Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 798.
71
See id. at 802.
61

continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s
qualifications.72
Second, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for
its decision.73 Third, the plaintiff must prove the employer’s articulated reason is nothing more
than a pretext for discrimination.74 And fourth, the employer must show a legitimate reason that
is untainted by discrimination for the denial of a person’s employment.75
In coming to a determination, the majority opined that Green should have been afforded
more time to rebut McDonnell Douglas’s assertions, that Title VII did not tolerate race
discrimination in any form, and that McDonnell Douglas was factually different from Griggs in
that Griggs dealt with education and testing, while McDonnell Douglas dealt with the unlawful
actions of Green.76 The majority opined that McDonnell Douglas did not decide whether to hire
Green based on his qualifications, but because of Green’s actions prior to his attempt to be
rehired.77 McDonnell Douglas is important for plaintiffs and defendants because it created a
shifting burden of proof requirement when plaintiffs are attempting to prove a case of disparatetreatment employment discrimination under Title VII.78
3. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A failure to conform to gender stereotypes.79
Price Waterhouse assisted LGBT individuals by demonstrating that discrimination
because of gender stereotypes is a triable issue under Title VII.80 While working at Price
Waterhouse, Hopkins attempted to gain full partnership, but was ultimately denied because she
failed to conform to common female stereotypes and behaviors.81 Hopkins did receive high
praise from various partners within Price Waterhouse, but there were many within the firm who
had concerns that Hopkins’s behavior was too masculine and not feminine enough.82
In making its determination in favor of Hopkins, the majority proclaimed that an
employer could not make an employment decision based solely on gender; that an employer
could not make an employment decision of a mixed nature, in that an employer cannot make an
employment decision based on reasons that would be considered of both a legitimate and
illegitimate determination; that an employer could not take an adverse action against an
employee or applicant based on gender without a valid business reason; and that an employee
72

See id.
See id. at 802-03.
74
See id. at 804.
75
See id.
76
See id. at 804-06; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1971) (explaining that Title VII does not
preclude the use of testing procedures, but it does forbid giving those procedures controlling force when they are not
a reasonable measure of job performance).
77
See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 806.
78
See id. at 807 (stating that Green was allowed to bring forth his claim under 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009)).
79
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
80
See id. at 258 (stating that gender stereotypes made by an organization for the purpose of hiring or promoting a
person is considered discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009)).
81
See id. at 231-33.
82
See id. at 234-35.
73

must show that an employer made a decision that affected the employee because of gender.83 In
essence, the majority opined that employment decisions based on gender without a valid business
reason constitute discrimination due to Title VII’s wording that, in part, states that discrimination
cannot take place “. . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.”84
4. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.: Same-gender discrimination.85
The Supreme Court’s determination in Oncale has proven to be an important decision for
LGBT individuals who allege same-gender harassment in the workplace.86 Oncale authorized
plaintiffs to bring same-sex discrimination suits if they could show they were discriminated
against by coworkers of the same gender because of a lack of gender conformity.87 The ability to
bring same-sex discrimination suits has helped to resolve employment-discrimination cases
alleged by LGBT individuals.88
Oncale worked on an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico and experienced adverse actions that
were sexual in nature from three coworkers of the same gender.89 Oncale reported the
harassment to his supervisors, but nothing was done to rectify the situation.90 Eventually, Oncale
left his job on the oil rig, noting the high level of stress and constant harassment as his reasons
for quitting.91
The Supreme Court determined, in part, that under Title VII, females and males are
equally protected and that a party is protected from discrimination that originates from an
employee of the same gender.92 The majority reasoned there are times when a court must go
beyond what Congress intended to do with a statute in order to apply the law fairly and equally
to those parties who file a claim.93
Oncale’s employer argued that by extending Title VII rights to cases such as Oncale, the
Court would be creating a statute of general courtesy.94 The majority opined, however, that such
assertions were groundless because Title VII protections already encompassed sexual harassment
towards those of the opposite gender.95 The majority noted that the requirements of Title VII

83

McDonnel Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792, at 244-47, 250.
See id. at 240 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (2009)).
85
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998).
86
See id. at 82.
87
See id. at 80-81.
88
See Garner & James, supra note 1, at 371-72.
89
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998).
90
See id.
91
See id.
92
See id. at 78 (noting that 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009) covers both men and women in regards to disparate
treatment in employment).
93
See id. at 79-80.
94
See id. at 80 (stating that a person must still prove all of the requirements set forth by 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17
(2009) in order to show employment discrimination).
95
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (stating that 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17
(2009) provides protection for both men and women).
84

must be met and proven in order for a claim to move forward.96 Furthermore, the Court
maintained that Title VII does not protect an employee from teasing or horseplay from coworkers, but instead protects an employee from same-sex harassment that could adversely and
pervasively alter the employee’s conditions of employment.97 In conclusion, the majority ruled
that when considering claims of sexual harassment under Title VII, such claims should be
distinguished correctly from behaviors between those of the same sex that are meant to be jokes
or rowdiness by undertaking a measure of prudence while examining the context of a case as it is
related to society.98
5. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Sexual harassment from a supervisor.99
The Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank has allowed LGBT individuals to bring a
claim based on sex discrimination that creates a hostile workplace environment.100 Mechelle
Vinson worked for the Meritor Savings Bank (the Bank) and alleged that she had been sexually
harassed by her supervisor, Taylor.101 Vinson asserted that Taylor subjected her to various
sexual acts that included inappropriate fondling, touching, and sexual favors so that, in Vinson’s
opinion, she could remain employed.102 Vinson eventually decided to take an indefinite period
of time off, but the Bank discharged Vinson two months after her leave began because of
excessive use of sick leave.103 Vinson filed suit against the Bank and Taylor, alleging that she
had been sexually harassed by Taylor in violation of Title VII.104
The trial court found that Taylor’s actions had not violated Title VII; Vinson appealed the
decision to the court of appeals, where the trial court’s findings were reversed.105 The Bank then
appealed the appellate court’s decision to the Supreme Court.106 The Court opined that Title VII
was meant to prevent the disparate treatment of all women and men in the workplace.107 The
Court further noted that there were EEOC guidelines that defined sexual harassment under Title
VII that were similar in nature to what Vinson had experienced.108

96

See id. at 80-82 (stating that the requirements of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009) must still be met to prove
employment discrimination).
97
See id. at 81-82 (noting that it must be shown how a coworker’s behavior met the requirements of 42 U.S.C.
§§2000e-2000e-17 (2009)).
98
See id. at 82 (noting that common sense and all of the facts of the case must be examined in conjunction with 42
U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009) to determine if employment discrimination has occurred).
99
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986).
100
See id. at 73.
101
See id. at 60.
102
See id.
103
See id.
104
See id. at 60 (alleging that the actions of the plaintiff’s supervisor were illegal under 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17
(2009).
105
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986).
106
See id. at 63.
107
See id. at 65. (Holding that 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009) was meant to protect women and men in the
workplace from discrimination, not just prevent the discrimination of one group or another).
108
See id.

Because the EEOC guidelines were created with case law in mind and were consistently
used by courts in Title VII hostile employment cases, the Court maintained the guidance was
valid.109 The Court further concluded that Vinson showed how the harassment in her work
environment had been sufficiently pervasive and severe to cause a working environment that was
abusive, thus causing the alteration of her employment conditions.110 In order for conduct to be
unwelcome, the Court noted, a person must indicate through action or word that said conduct
was unwelcome.111 Therefore, the Court held that Vinson did have an actionable claim under
Title VII for sex discrimination that caused a hostile work environment.112
6. Harris v. Forklift System, Inc.: An abusive work environment because of gender.113
Teresa Harris worked for Forklift Systems, Inc. (Forklift) as a manager and was
consistently harassed by the president of Forklift, Charles Hardy, because of her gender.114
Harris alleged that Hardy’s harassment included sexually demeaning comments based on her
gender.115 Harris quit her job at Forklift because of Hardy’s harassment and proceeded to file
suit under Title VII for abusive work environment based on gender.116 The trial court did not
find in favor of Harris, reasoning that Hardy’s behavior did not affect Harris’s psychological
well-being in a serious manner.117 Harris appealed the trial court’s decision, but the appellate
court upheld the lower court’s decision.118 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.119
The Court opined that Title VII encompasses all disparate treatment of women and men
in the workplace and that Title VII is violated when an employee’s actions in the workplace are
pervasive or severe enough to affect another employee’s work environment.120 The Court further
noted that Title VII does not require the psychological well-being of a person to be affected
seriously by the harassment or require a person to succumb to a nervous breakdown.121 The
hostile work environment test, the Court maintained, was not a precise test, but was instead
meant to examine cases on an individual level to determine if Title VII had been violated.122
Because the lower courts failed to properly consider the appropriate hostile work environment
test in Harris’s case, the Court reversed the appellate court’s decision.123
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7. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth: Quitting because of sexual harassment.124
Kimberly Ellerth worked for Burlington Industries (Burlington) as a salesperson where
she experienced verbal and physical sexual harassment from a supervisor.125 Ellerth never
informed her superiors about the sexual harassment, and she eventually decided to leave
Burlington’s employment because of the continuing harassment.126 Ellerth then filed suit
alleging, among several charges, that one of Burlington’s supervisors had committed sexual
harassment and had thus created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.127 The
trial court, finding that there was no triable issue and that Ellerth had failed to report the
supervisor’s behavior, granted summary judgment in favor of Burlington.128 Ellerth appealed the
trial court’s decision, and the court of appeals reversed, citing vicarious liability on the part of
Burlington as the essence of the suit brought forth by Ellerth.129 Burlington appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court.130
The Court maintained that in order for vicarious liability to apply to an employer in a
Title VII hostile-work-environment case, a supervisor must have control over an employee that is
immediate.131 The Court proclaimed that if there are no tangible employment actions taken
against an employee by an employer, the employer could use an affirmative defense consisting
of two elements to show by a preponderance of the evidence that vicarious liability did not apply
to the employer.132 The two elements of this defense, the Court asserted, required:
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or
to avoid harm otherwise.133
The Court noted, however, that when there is an employment action that tangibly results
in a discharge, when there is a reassignment that is not desirable by an employee, or when there
is a discharge of the employee, an affirmative defense could not be used by the employer.134 The
Court determined that Burlington was liable for the supervisor’s alleged actions based on the
theory of vicarious liability because the supervisor’s alleged actions led to Ellerth’s decision to
leave Burlington’s employment.135 Burlington Industries is an important vicarious liability case
because the Court specified what is required for vicarious liability to apply in an employment
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context.136 In essence, the Court created a new employment discrimination test based on
vicarious liability that would allow plaintiffs to show how they had been discriminated against in
the workplace.137
8. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: Sexual harassment at the city pool.138
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton is a companion case to Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth because both cases deal with vicarious liability and because the Supreme Court
considered and rendered an opinion on both cases at the same time.139 Faragher, like Burlington
Industries, Inc., is an important vicarious liability case that has helped plaintiffs to apply
vicarious liability to an employer, or its agents, that has allegedly committed workplace
discrimination.140 Beth Faragher worked for the city of Boca Raton as a lifeguard.141 While
working for Boca Raton, Faragher alleged that two of her supervisors verbally harassed her and
other female lifeguards in a sexual manner, thus adversely affecting the privileges, terms, and
conditions of Faragher’s employment.142
Faragher quit her job at Boca Raton because of her supervisors’ behavior; she filed suit
against Boca Raton and her supervisors alleging sexual harassment and hostile work
environment under Title VII.143 The trial court ruled in Faragher’s favor, noting that the
supervisors’ behavior did alter Faragher’s employment in its conditions and therefore constituted
an abusive working environment.144 Boca Raton appealed the trial court’s ruling, and the circuit
reversed.145 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.146
The Court maintained that in order for vicarious liability to apply to an employer in a
Title VII hostile work environment suit, a supervisor must have immediate control over an
employee.147 The Court proclaimed that if an employer took no tangible employment actions
against an employee, the employer could use an affirmative defense consisting of two elements
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that vicarious liability did not apply to the
employer.148 The two elements of this defense, the Court announced, require:
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
136
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preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or
to avoid harm otherwise.149
The Court, however, noted that when there is an employment action that tangibly results
in a discharge, when there is a reassignment that is not desirable by an employee, or when there
is a discharge of the employee, the affirmative defense could not be used by the employer.150
The Court reversed the appellate court’s decision because Faragher’s supervisors had complete
authority to oversee and direct Faragher; the Court also noted that Faragher was not aware of
Boca Raton’s anti-harassment policies and could not reasonably report the supervisors’ behavior,
thus subjecting Boca Raton to liability under Title VII.151 The Court further maintained that the
actions of Faragher’s supervisors rose to the necessary level of an actionable case, in that the
supervisors actions were sufficiently adverse to create a hostile work environment claim under
Title VII, thus subjecting Boca Raton to vicarious liability.152

C. Appellate court cases associated with LGBT employment-discrimination claims
under Title VII
This subsection will introduce the case facts of a select number of federal circuit-courtemployment-discrimination cases brought by LGBT individuals.153
1. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati: A case of command presence.154
In this Sixth Circuit case, the court made a determination that showed how a person could
prove an allegation of employment discrimination based on gender under Title VII.155 Barnes,
who was making the transition from male to female, worked for the Cincinnati Police
Department (CPD) when she successfully passed CPD’s sergeant examination; she was
subsequently promoted to the rank of sergeant on a probationary basis.156 During Barnes’s
probation, she was systematically discriminated against when CPD treated and evaluated her
differently than other probationary sergeants because Barnes’s behavior did not fall within
typical male stereotypes.157 When Barnes’s probationary period was complete, CPD failed
Barnes, citing a lack of command presence.158
Barnes brought suit against the city of Cincinnati alleging that CPD had committed
sexual discrimination under Title VII based on her lack of gender conformity.159 At the
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conclusion of trial, the jury decided in favor of Barnes.160 The city of Cincinnati then appealed
the jury’s decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.161 By using the test created in
McDonnell Douglas, the majority proclaimed that Barnes had shown how she had been
discriminated against by CPD when it refused to allow Barnes’s promotion to remain in effect.162
After considering all of the facts and case law, which included Smith v. City of Salem
(discussed below), the majority declared that Barnes was a member of a protected class; that
Barnes did not have to present an exact match between her treatment and the treatment of her
coworkers; that Barnes had adequately proven her claims for discrimination under Title VII; and
that Barnes had properly presented and argued her discrimination claim.163 For the above-stated
reasons, the majority affirmed the jury’s findings.164 Barnes is an excellent example of how an
LGBT individual can make a successful claim under Title VII while showing how to properly
present and argue a case of Title VII employment discrimination.165
2. Smith v. City of Salem: Trying to put out a fire.166
There are times when transgender individuals receive the brunt of employment
discrimination, especially when transitioning from male to female or female to male.
Discrimination against these parties can be acute because it can be hard for them to fit into a
typical gender profile. Smith worked for the Salem, Ohio Fire Department as a firefighter.167
Several of Smith’s coworkers started to notice a change in Smith when she began transitioning
from male to female.168 In an attempt to prevent any problems from occurring, Smith went to a
supervisor to explain the situation.169 However, Smith’s supervisor decided to inform the Fire
Department’s chief, who then collaborated with several other city officials in an attempt to force
Smith to quit because of Smith’s gender non-conformity.170 Despite these attempts, Smith did
not quit, nor was she fired.171
In making a determination of Smith’s discrimination claim, the majority opined that
Smith had shown that her actions were protected under Title VII; that the Salem Fire Department
was aware of Smith’s protected behavior; that the Fire Department acted adversely towards
Smith despite its awareness of her protected behavior; and that Smith had been able to show an
affiliation between her protected actions and the Fire Department’s detrimental actions.172 The
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majority also found that the Salem Fire Department’s actions were due to Smith’s failure to fit
into a typical gender stereotype.173 Furthermore, the majority found that because of Smith’s
work suspension, the Salem Fire Department’s actions did establish a negative effect on the
conditions and terms of Smith’s employment.174
3. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority: Barred from using certain restrooms.175
Discrimination against LGBT individuals in the workplace can be commonplace, but
sometimes, transgender individuals who are making the transition from male to female or female
to male face stronger discrimination because of a lack of gender conformity. Etsitty began
working as a bus driver at the Utah Transit Authority (UTA).176 Because Etsitty was in the
process of transitioning from male to female, she was using female restrooms while on her bus
route.177 Out of concern that Etsitty’s restroom usage could create litigation because she was still
biologically male, UTA decided to release Etsitty from its employment, despite Etsitty’s
unblemished employment record.178
The majority opined, through the use of precedent that included McDonnell Douglas, that
Etsitty had failed to properly prove her case of employment discrimination under Title VII.179
By using the McDonnell Douglas test, the majority maintained that UTA had a legitimate
business reason for releasing Etsitty from its employment, in that UTA was concerned about
possible litigation over Etsitty’s use of female restrooms during work hours when she was still
technically a male.180 The majority further found that Etsitty had failed to rebut UTA’s genuine
business reason for releasing Etsitty.181 Etsitty’s failure to rebut UTA’s assertions helps to show
that a claim of this nature must be carefully crafted so that any assertion of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action made by an employer can be
properly rebutted while showing that discrimination under Title VII did occur against an LGBT
individual.182
4. Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.: A burger, with a side of
discrimination.183
At times, discrimination in the workplace can be pervasive, especially when a person
fails to conform to certain stereotypes associated with his or her gender. This was especially true
for Sanchez, who worked as a waiter at an Azteca restaurant, where many of his mannerisms did
173
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not fit within the male norm.184 While working at Azteca, Sanchez was persistently harassed by
coworkers and a supervisor because of his mannerisms.185 Sanchez told his coworkers to stop,
considered such behavior to be unwelcome, and reported the harassment to his supervisors.186
But little was done about Sanchez’s situation, and he was eventually fired from Azteca for
leaving work in the middle of his shift after a volatile argument with an assistant manager.187
After examining all of the evidence presented by Sanchez and the record of the trial
court, the majority proclaimed that the behavior of Sanchez’s coworkers did constitute sexual
harassment as defined by Title VII.188 The majority noted that the behavior of Sanchez’s
coworkers was not welcome; that Sanchez had told his coworkers to desist from the offensive
behavior; that Sanchez had reported the offensive behavior to his supervisors; that seen through
the eyes of a reasonable person, the behavior committed by Sanchez’s coworkers could be seen
as sexual harassment under Title VII; that Sanchez’s claims under Title VII were viable because
of the decision made in Price Waterhouse, in that Sanchez’s behavior did not fall under typical
male stereotypes; and that Sanchez had provided sufficient evidence to support his claim under
Title VII.189 Thus, the majority proclaimed that Sanchez had a claim under Title VII for sexual
harassment.190
5. Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc.: Walking in the wrong way.191
Gender stereotyping can be quite pervasive in the workplace, especially when one
considers the strength of gender roles within the United States. Prowel worked for Wise
Business Forms (Wise) on the production line.192 Because Prowel lacked gender conformity in
the way that he acted and carried himself, several coworkers heckled and launched slurs at him
and left sexually abusive material at Prowel’s workspace.193 Prowel met with Wise management
in an attempt to solve the situation, but nothing was done about the harassment he experienced;
citing a lack of available work at Wise, Prowel’s supervisors eventually fired him.194 Prowel
brought suit against Wise, alleging sexual harassment under Title VII.195 Wise filed a motion for
summary judgement after the completion of discovery, and the court granted Wise’s motion.196
Prowel then appealed the court’s decision.197
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When considering Prowel’s case, the majority maintained that Prowel had submitted
enough evidence to support his claim of sexual harassment under Title VII.198 However, because
of the ambiguity of whether Prowel was discriminated against because of his sexual orientation
or because he failed to conform to gender stereotypes, the case had to be considered by a jury.199
Therefore, the majority remanded Prowel’s case to the district court for further consideration.200
6. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.: The butler did it.201
In a workplace predominantly comprised of males, discrimination due to a lack of gender
conformity can be very acute. This fact was especially true for Rene, who worked as a butler at
MGM Grand Hotel (MGM) with other male butlers.202 While employed at MGM, Rene was
subjected to pervasive as well as continuous verbal and physical abuse that included touching in
an extreme manner.203 Rene provided evidence that showed how the majority of his coworkers,
including a supervisor, took part in the harassment, primarily because Rene was homosexual.204
In making a decision in favor of Rene, the majority disregarded sexual orientation in light
of the pervasiveness of the harassment, noting that in cases involving women in similar
situations, sexual orientation was irrelevant.205 Furthermore, by relying in part on Oncale, the
majority opined that the behavior of Rene’s coworkers was based on Rene’s lack of gender
conformity; that Rene’s coworkers’ behavior was both sexual and discriminatory in nature; and
that the behavior of Rene’s coworkers fell under the types of behavior that are prohibited under
Title VII.206
7. Dawson v. Entek International: Harassment based on sexual orientation.207
Without properly pleading and arguing a Title VII discrimination case, an LGBT plaintiff
has little hope of being successful in an attempt to sue an employer for harassment involving
gender; Dawson is an example of such a situation.208 Dawson began working at Entek
International (Entek) on a production line where several coworkers were already aware that
Dawson was homosexual.209 Over a one-month period, Dawson experienced sexual harassment
that included derogatory statements from his coworkers because of his sexual orientation, thus
causing him a high level of stress.210 Because of this stress, Dawson decided to take one day
198
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off.211 When Dawson returned to work the next day, he informed the human resources
department at Entek about the sexual harassment he was experiencing.212 Entek fired Dawson
from his position two days after he called in sick because of his failure to follow Entek’s
company policy that required an employee to inform a supervisor at least one hour before a
scheduled shift was to begin that the employee would be unable to work the shift.213
The majority maintained Dawson had failed to prove or properly argue his claim for
hostile work environment due to sex.214 Dawson failed in this regard because he did not provide
any persuasive evidence that he was being harassed due to a lack of gender conformity in the
workplace.215 Furthermore, Dawson failed to meet the requirements set down by McDonnell
Douglas.216 Thus, Dawson did not have a claim under Title VII for same-gender harassment.217
Dawson helps to show how an LGBT individual must properly argue and present evidence by
showing that an adverse action has taken place against him because of a failure to conform to
gender stereotypes.218
8. Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Company: Sexual harassment based on
identity.219
In a sexual-harassment case, an LGBT individual must meet certain criteria to show that
sexual discrimination occurred in the workplace.220 The criteria that must be met include
showing how sexual harassment could adversely and pervasively alter a person’s conditions of
employment.221 Bibby is a case where the plaintiff failed to take these criteria into
consideration.222 While working for a Coca-Cola bottling plant in Philadelphia, Bibby was the
target of harassment based in part on his sexual orientation.223 He alleged, in part, that his
coworkers and supervisor regularly harassed him sexually.224 He filed a complaint with the
Philadelphia Human Rights Commission and later requested the right to sue his employer and
coworkers.225 Bibby’s request was granted, and he filed suit in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.226 After discovery had been conducted, Bibby’s employer filed a motion for
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summary judgment, and the district court granted it.227 Bibby then filed an appeal with the Third
Circuit of the Court of Appeals.228
Because the harassment was in large part due to Bibby’s sexual orientation, he was
unable to show that the origin of the harassment was due to his gender.229 The majority
proclaimed that Bibby failed to prove he was discriminated against under Title VII; the evidence
showed, the majority maintained, the harassment was due to his sexual orientation, not because
of his lack of gender conformity.230 Furthermore, the majority noted that once a party proves
that he or she has been discriminated against because of a lack of gender conformity, the
person’s sexual orientation is of no consequence.231 Bibby’s situation was very similar to the
facts in Dawson, in that Dawson and Bibby were both harassed because of their sexual
orientation and were both unable to show they were harassed because of gender.232
9. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.: Harassment based on sexual identity.233
When bringing a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII, an LGBT individual must
be sure to distinguish discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on
gender. At New Balance Athletic Shoes, Inc. (New Balance), Higgins worked in the production
facility and had few problems with the administration.234 However, a number of employees and
supervisors sexually harassed Higgins based solely on his homosexuality.235 The sexual
harassment Higgins experienced included derogatory and vulgar remarks.236 Due to several
altercations with fellow employees, management at New Balance decided to fire Higgins, citing
his lack of communication skills.237
Higgins lost, the majority asserted, because he failed to properly demonstrate, with a
preponderance of evidence, his case under Title VII.238 When appealing the decision, Higgins
brought forth two new theories based on Title VII’s requirement that harassment occur “because
of . . . sex” and the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse.239 However, the majority
maintained that Higgins had failed to properly present these theories when his case was tried at
the district court, thereby negating Higgins’s new theories.240 The majority further proclaimed
that Higgins failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove his case of sexual harassment as
227
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denoted by Oncale, which requires a plaintiff to show that behavior is based on sex and is not
merely offensive to the plaintiff.241
10. Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc.: Not allowing LGBT
individuals to work at an establishment.242
When dealing with employment discrimination against LGBT individuals, employers
with a certain set of religious beliefs sometimes object to employing them. Vance, a lesbian, was
a potential employee of Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children (KBHC) who joined a
discrimination suit under Title VII alleging that KBHC’s practice of not hiring or employing
LGBT individuals was illegal.243 Vance contended she was fully qualified for a job at KBHC
caring for children, but because of KBHC’s policy that prohibited the employment of LGBT
individuals, Vance was unable to work at KBHC.244
Because KBHC’s policy excluded LGBT individuals from its employment, Vance
contended she had been discriminated against under Title VII.245 The majority opined that
because Vance did not properly argue her case under Title VII, have standing under Title VII to
allege that she was discriminated against because of her sex, or apply for the job in question,
Vance’s claims under Title VII were moot.246

D. The district court cases that are associated with LGBT employment
discrimination under Title VII
In this subsection, a presentation of a select number of district court cases that dealt with
employment discrimination against LGBT individuals under Title VII shall be introduced.247
1. Centola v. Potter: Delivering discrimination.248
When an LGBT individual files an employment-discrimination claim under Title VII, he
or she must be sure to bring forth sufficient evidence to properly assert a claim of sex
discrimination. A plaintiff cannot simply make an allegation without any supporting evidence,
but instead must provide a preponderance of proof to show that the plaintiff has been
discriminated against due to gender or because of a failure to conform to gender stereotypes.249
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Centola worked at the United States Post Office as a mail carrier for a number of years.250 While
Centola was gay, he never revealed his homosexual status to his coworkers, but Centola’s
coworkers still harassed him in a verbal nature and left sexually explicit items at his
workstation.251 Centola’s coworkers treated him differently when compared to other coworkers;
when Centola asked his coworkers to stop the harassment, they ignored his requests.252 Centola
also informed his supervisors of the situation, but Centola’s supervisors did nothing to correct
the situation.253 Centola filed suit against the United States Postal Service alleging, among
several charges, that he had been sexually harassed and discharged from his job because he did
not conform to the gender stereotypes held by his co-workers and because of his sex.254 The
United States Postal Service contested Centola’s claims and filed a motion for summary
judgment.255
After examining the evidence, Judge Gertner proclaimed Centola had a case for sexual
harassment under Title VII because he had provided evidence that could provide an inference
that he had been harassed based on gender and sex stereotyping, thereby negating a motion for
summary judgement.256 Judge Gertner further opined that because Centola’s co-workers and
supervisors were unaware of his sexual orientation, the United States Postal Service’s assertion
that Centola’s discrimination was based on his sexual orientation was groundless.257
2. Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club: Cooking discrimination.258
Commonly held ideals and misconceptions that are maintained by some about other
groups can be, at times, hard to overcome. Heller, a lesbian, worked for Columbia Edgewater
(Columbia) as a cook.259 While working at Columbia, Heller, as well as several other openly gay
coworkers and friends of Heller, were systematically harassed by her supervisor, Cagle, for
failing to conform to typical gender stereotypes.260 Cagle’s alleged sexual harassment included
derogatory comments, slurs, and questions concerning Heller’s gender non-conformity and
sexuality with other parties.261 Cagle treated Heller, Heller’s friends, and the other openly gay
employees differently when compared to the other employees at Columbia by making statements
about their gender non-conformity and sexual orientations, thus adversely affecting Heller’s
work environment.262
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Cagle further subjected Heller, Heller’s friends, and the other openly gay employees to
more and harder work, and she was overly critical of Heller’s shift when the shift was doing
work that was comparable to the other shifts.263 Heller was also written up several times by
Cagle for actions that were typically overlooked when committed by heterosexual employees.264
Eventually, Heller was fired by Cagle, who claimed that Heller failed to improve her
performance after receiving the write-ups.265 After Heller’s termination, she filed suit against
Columbia alleging that she was discriminated against because of sex as defined by Title VII.266
After considering all of the evidence, Judge Jelderks denied Columbia’s motion for
summary judgement and proclaimed that Heller did have sufficient evidence to move forward in
her Title VII harassment claims.267 Furthermore, Judge Jelderks maintained that Heller had
provided sufficient evidence to show that she could have been harassed and discharged for lack
of conforming to gender stereotypes, thus further negating Columbia’s assertions.268
Judge Jelderks maintained that as long as a supervisor’s conduct is pervasive enough to
cause harassment, the exact number of times the behavior occurred is irrelevant.269 Judge
Jelderks stressed that even though Cagle had not been physically threatening, this fact did not
relieve Cagle or Columbia of liability under Title VII.270 Judge Jelderks also noted that Heller
had asked Cagle to desist from the harassment, but the behavior continued.271 Furthermore,
Judge Jelderks maintained that the testimony provided at court suggested animus emanating from
Cagle towards Heller and her friends.272
3. Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc.: Discrimination based on an
alleged lie.273
Some people automatically assume, without basis, that LGBT individuals lack morals
and are prone to lie. Lopez, a transgender person who lived her life completely as a female but
was not yet a full female, applied for a job at River Oaks as a scheduler.274 Lopez filled out all
of the necessary paperwork for the job at River Oaks with her female name and male name.275
The interview and background check were successful, and Lopez was offered the position.276
But upper management at River Oaks soon discovered Lopez’s transgender status.277 Citing
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Lopez’s supposed deception about her gender on her application and background check, River
Oaks revoked the job offer and Lopez filed suit.278
In concluding that Lopez did have a triable case of sex discrimination under Title VII,
Judge Atlas stressed several facts presented to the court during a hearing pertaining to a motion
for summary judgement that River Oaks filed.279 First, Judge Atlas maintained that Lopez had
provided enough evidence for the claims made under Title VII to move forward.280 Second,
despite River Oaks’s assertions to the contrary, Judge Atlas maintained that Lopez had provided
both her male and female name on all of the relevant paperwork necessary to work at River
Oaks, and that none of the parties associated with hiring Lopez were confused by the two names
that were provided by Lopez.281 And third, Judge Atlas proclaimed that Lopez’s status as a
transgender person did not bar a claim under Title VII, that River Oaks’s perception of Lopez did
play a role in River Oaks’s decision not to hire Lopez, and because River Oaks viewed Lopez
and other transgender individuals as not falling under typical gender profiles, the suit would
move forward.282
4. Schroer v. Billington: Making assumptions in the library.283
When examining a person’s history, one has a tendency to automatically make
assumptions about the person based solely on the person’s past. Schroer, a transgender
individual who had just begun to put herself out as female, applied for a job at the Library of
Congress (the Library).284 Schroer was highly qualified for the job, having an extensive military
history and a top secret clearance.285 Before learning of Schroer’s status as a transgender
individual, the Library offered the job to Schroer.286 However, upon learning that Schroer was a
transgender individual, the Library secretly planned to revoke Schroer’s job offer based solely on
Schroer’s status as a transgender individual and offer the job to another applicant.287
Representatives of the Library created several reasons why Schroer could not be hired by
the Library.288 The Library’s alleged concerns were that Schroer would no longer have the
necessary security clearance to work at the Library; that Schroer would lose her contacts and
credibility to testify at Congress after making her transition from male to female; that Schroer’s
transition would distract her co-workers; and that because Schroer lied to the Library about her
transition from male to female, Schroer was not trustworthy.289 When Schroer learned why she
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did not get the job at the Library, she filed suit against the Library alleging that the Library had
committed sex discrimination under Title VII.290
In order to reach a determination on a motion for summary judgement filed by the
Library, Judge Robertson examined arguments from both the Library and Schroer.291 After
examining these arguments and the evidence produced by both parties that included depositions,
testimony, and internal correspondence within the Library, Judge Robertson proclaimed that
Schroer did have a claim for gender discrimination as defined by Title VII.292 To come to this
conclusion, Judge Robertson noted that the reasons provided by the Library that included
concerns over Schroer’s security clearance and Schroer losing vital contacts related to the job at
the Library were pretextual, in that the Library had failed to properly determine if Schroer’s
contacts and top secret clearance would be affected in an adverse way by her transgender
status.293
Judge Robertson further stressed that the actions of Preece, the employee at the Library
responsible for deciding if Schroer would be hired, was biased against Schroer and that Preece
was only attempting to make an excuse not to hire Schroer because she did not fit into typical
gender stereotypes.294 Judge Robertson declared that Schroer did have a triable case for gender
discrimination under Title VII and denied the Library’s motion to dismiss Schroer’s claims
because Schroer provided sufficient evidence and properly argued her case while also showing
that the Library’s reasons for not hiring her were merely a pretext.295

IV. Final Thoughts
Employment discrimination against LGBT individuals is still a controversial issue within
the United States, but the federal court system has taken important steps in preventing further
discrimination.296 The Supreme Court has created a number of important tests and decisions,
including a test of shifting burdens and how same-gender harassment is not permitted under Title
VII, which have assisted in preventing workplace discrimination under Title VII.297
Additionally, the Supreme Court created a test that allowed LGBT individuals to assert
employment discrimination based on vicarious liability that would apply to an employer when a
supervisor has direct control over an employee that is immediate.298
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Furthermore, when there is an employment action that tangibly results in a discharge,
when there is a reassignment that is not desirable by an employee, or when there is a discharge of
the employee, an employer cannot use an affirmative defense in a vicarious liability employment
discrimination case.299 But the court system has not yet come to a consensus in how to deal with
employment discrimination allegations brought by LGBT individuals, particularly when the
discrimination is associated with sexual orientation.300
In order to be successful, an LGBT individual must assert that employment
discrimination was because of gender or sex, a failure to conform to gender stereotypes, or
because of sexual harassment.301 Typically, courts will not recognize an allegation of
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation unless the discrimination can be shown
to be similar to heterosexual employment discrimination.302 The claims that seem to have the
most success involve discrimination against LGBT individuals who fail to conform to gender
stereotypes.303
But success could prove to be elusive, for Title VII claims brought forth by LGBT
individuals are still very difficult to prove.304 As Judge Gertner noted in Centola, if a person is
stereotyped and the behavior results in discrimination because of his or her gender, then sexual
orientation is irrelevant under Title VII and the employer has allowed itself to become liable
under Title VII.305 Until such time as the court system comes to a consensus in how to decide
employment-discrimination claims brought by LGBT individuals under Title VII, an easier
remedy for LGBT individuals will be difficult to find.
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